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This paper presents a universal logit model for P&R patronage. This model was estimated 
from a Stated Choice experiment, in which 805 car drivers chose among car, P&R and public 
transport alternatives. In addition to main-effects, attribute cross-effects were estimated 
denoting the utility change of an alternative due to changes in the attribute levels of another 
alternative. The results indicate that improving the levels of the P&R related attributes has a 
negligible effect on the utility of the car alternative, whereas worsening the levels of the car-
related attributes increases the utility of the P&R facility. Considering the estimated main-
effects as well as the estimated cross-effects suggests that ‘stick’ (push) policy measures are 
more effective to stimulate P&R patronage than ‘carrot’ (pull) policy measures. The paper 
further reports that the extension of the model by adding cross-effects to the main-effects 
resulted in a better model fit and that the resulting model could more accurately predict the 
choices for new observations. 
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1. Introduction 
Park and Ride (P&R) facilities are often introduced to cope with accessibility problems in 
urban areas where there are congestion and parking difficulties. However, not all 
implemented P&R facilities attract the expected number of car drivers (Bos, 2004). To 
increase P&R patronage, policy measures have to be developed. Then the question arises 
which type of policy measures will attract more P&R users: pull or push measures, also 
called ‘carrot’ or ‘stick’ measures. ‘Carrot’ measures involve upgrading the quality of P&R 
and the connecting public transport, and aim at inducing travellers to use P&R. ‘Stick’ 
measures involve making the car alternative less attractive, for example increasing parking 
costs in city centres. To answer this question, the preferences and choices of car drivers 
regarding P&R facilities have to be examined. 
In previous papers (Bos, 2004; Bos et al., 2003; Bos et al., 2004) we reported on the results of 
a Stated Choice experiment, in which respondents were requested to choose among P&R, car 
and public transport alternatives. The P&R and the car alternative both varied across choice 
sets with respect to a number of ‘stick’- and ‘carrot’-related attributes, while the public 
transport was chosen as base alternative that did not vary among the choice sets and referred 
to the car drivers’ public transport alternative for the complete trip. The model results 
indicated that car drivers are more sensitive to changes in costs and time attributes related to 
P&R than to changes related to the car alternative. This suggests that ‘carrot’ type policy 
measures would be more effective in increasing P&R patronage than ‘stick’ policy measures, 
although Ghali et al. (1997) and O’Fallon et al. (2004) found that ‘sticks’ would generally 
have a greater influence on stated mode choice than ‘carrots’. 
These results were based on an MNL model, a model that is routinely applied when 
modelling transport mode choices (e.g. Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). An important 
assumption of this model is the independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA)-property. 
This means that the ratio of the choice probabilities of any two alternatives is entirely 
unaffected by the systematic utilities of any other alternative. This assumption implies that 
decreasing the utility of the car alternative, for example by increasing parking fees in inner 
cities, would result in the same increase in P&R and public transport patronage in proportion 
to their utilities. The question is whether this assumption holds. In this paper it is tested 
whether the MNL assumption holds by estimating the universal logit model McFadden et al. 
(1978) proposed as a test of the IIA-property. This implies that the utility function is extended 
with so-called cross-effects, indicating to what extent the utility of an alternative changes 
when attributes in another alternative are taking a different value. The aim of this paper is to 
estimate these cross-effects and to examine whether these are systematically related to ‘stick’ 
and ‘carrot’ policy measures concerning P&R patronage.  
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section the MNL model and the universal logit 
model are explained in more detail. This is followed by a discussion of experimental design, 
and the presentation and interpretation of the cross-effect results. Additionally, it is examined 
whether the model including cross-effects predicts new observations better than the MNL 
model. The final section draws some conclusions and discusses policy implications. 
Bos and Molin 
European Journal of Transport and Infrastructure Research 
277
2. Methodology 
Most choice experiments in transportation research (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985) assume 
that an MNL model represents the choice process. This model can be described as follows. 
Let j denote an alternative in the choice sets used in the choice experiment and let jU  denote 
the utility of j. It is typically assumed that utility is stochastic, implying 
jjj VU ε+=  (1) 
where: 
jU  = utility of alternative j; 
jV  = structural utility component of alternative j; 
jε  = random utility component. 
 
The random utility component captures non-systematic variance in choice, i.e. variance that 
is not related to the attributes presented. If it is assumed that the structural component of the 
utility function is compensatory, i.e. a weighted additive function is assumed, then the 
function that is estimated can be expressed as:  
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where: 
j0α = alternative-specific constant of alternative j, included in the experiment; 
ijlα  = coefficient for indicator variable of rating level l of attribute i;  
ijlX  = indicator variable for rating level l of attribute i describing alternative j. 
 
Assuming that the error terms jε  are independent and distributed across choice alternatives 
the probability of choosing alternative j, being a function of structural utilities jV  in a choice 
set, is expressed by the well-known multinomial logit (MNL) model of the following form:  
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where: 
jp  = probability of choosing alternative j;  
S = choice set of j alternatives; 
 
The MNL model is based on the assumption that model errors are independently and 
identically distributed (IID) Gumbel across alternatives having the consequence that the IIA-
assumption is assumed. The implication of this property is that the ratios of the probabilities 
of all alternatives will remain the same even if a single alternative is removed or added.  
An approach to test for potential violations of the IIA-assumption is the universal logit model 
(McFadden, 1975; see also McFadden et al., 1978). This model relaxes the MNL cross-
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elasticity properties by including attributes of competing alternatives in the utility function 
for some or all alternatives in the choice set (McFadden et al., 1978).  
In order to use the universal logit model and thus to include cross-effects in the choice model, 
equation 2 has to be extended as follows: 
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where: 
iklλ  = coefficient for indicator variable for cross-effects of rating level l of attribute i;  
iklX  = indicator variable for rating level l of attribute i describing alternative k (other 
alternatives than alternative j) 
 
The appearance of significant cross-effects for the effect of alternative k would imply that the 
IIA-assumption no longer holds, so the utility of an alternative depends on the attributes of 
another alternative. A positive cross-effect involves that the utility of an alternative increases 
due to the fact that an attribute in another alternative takes a different value. The result is that 
the choice probability of that alternative increases more than proportionally. Likewise, a 
negative effect decreases the utility with a proportionally lower choice probability as a result.  
The estimated cross-effects can be interpreted in the context of the discussion on ‘carrot’ or 
‘stick’ measures. For example, imagine that a ‘stick’ policy measure is applied which 
increases parking costs in inner cities. Further, imagine that a positive cross-effect for 
increased car costs on the P&R alternative would be found. In that case this would indicate 
that the utility of P&R increases and consequently the choice probability of P&R increases 
more than expected under the IIA-assumption. As this is an additional effect, on top of 
change induced by the decreased utility of the car alternative due to the increased car costs, 
this effect could be interpreted as a ‘stick’ bonus. Likewise, if a positive cross-effect would 
be found for attributes related to ‘carrot’ policy measures, this could be interpreted as a 
‘carrot’ bonus. 
The universal logit model has not very often been applied in the transportation literature to 
interpret cross-effects. This may be due to lack of consistency with regard to utility 
maximization in some cases, the potential to obtain counter-intuitive elasticities, and the 
complexity of search for a preferred specification as suggested by Ben-Akiva (1974). As 
doubts on the validity of this model have been raised in the past, this paper will especially 
pay attention to the soundness of the results by carefully examining the face validity of the 
estimated cross-effects, the model fit, the predictive ability, and discussing the replication of 
the results in a second study.  
3. Experimental design  
3.1 Experimental design 
To estimate cross-effects, one needs to construct a stated choice experiment that allows the 
unbiased estimation of the set of cross-effects beyond the estimation of the usual attribute 
effects. To estimate these effects in an efficient way, not only the attributes of each 
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alternative need to be orthogonal but also the attributes across the alternatives. In case of two 
choice alternatives with varying attribute levels and the included current public transport 
alternative treated as a base alternative, this can be achieved by constructing choice sets 
according to an LM*N design, where L refers to the number of levels per attribute, M to the 
number of alternatives and N to the number of attributes per alternative. With such a design 
one constructs simultaneously the attribute levels for all alternatives included in the choice 
set (Louviere et al., 2000). 
 
Table 1. Selected attributes and their levels 
P&R Car 
attributes levels attributes levels 
Quality P&R 4 Delays by car 0 min 
  6  20 min 
  8  40 min 
Quality PT 4 Car costs at destination € 0.50 
  6  € 3.50 
  8  € 6.50 
Time loss P&R 0 min   
  10 min   
  20 min   
Costs of P&R € 0.--   
  € 2.--   
  € 4.--   
 
Table 1 presents the attributes and their levels that were selected to vary the P&R and car 
alternatives. The quality of P&R and the quality of public transport are expressed as levels on 
a ten-point scale. Respondents had to imagine that a P&R facility with connecting public 
transport was realized, which they would evaluate with the level presented in the alternative. 
How these quality levels can be explained, hence which configuration of the attributes 
describing the quality of the P&R facility and the connecting public transport, is discussed in 
detail in previous publications (Bos, 2004; Bos et al., 2004), and will therefore not be further 
discussed here. Note that policy measures aiming at increasing the quality of the P&R 
facilities and the connecting public transport and minimizing time loss to P&R use and P&R 
costs, can be classified as ‘carrot’ policy measures, whereas policy measures aiming at 
increasing the time delay and the costs of the car alternative can be classified as ‘stick’ policy 
measures.  
This selection of six attributes all varied in three levels would require a 36 full factorial 
design. By assuming that all interaction-effects are equal to zero, we selected the smallest 
possible fractional factorial design by which all main-effects can be estimated. This resulted 
in the construction of 18 choice sets. Two examples of the choice task are provided in figure 
1. 
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 Example 1        
 Quality P&R facility 
Quality connecting PT  
Extra time using P&R 
Extra costs using P&R 
6 
6 
0 min 
€ 4 
 Extra time using car 
Extra costs using car  
40 min 
 
€ 0.50 
 Current PT 
without delays 
 
         
 P&R   CAR   PT  
         
 Example 2        
 Quality P&R facility 
Quality connecting PT  
Extra time using P&R 
Extra costs using P&R 
6 
6 
20 min 
€ 0 
 Extra time using car 
Extra costs using car 
0 min 
 
€ 6.50 
 Current PT 
without delays 
 
         
 P&R   CAR   PT  
         
Figure 1. Examples of choice task 
3.2 Data collection 
The choice experiment was integrated in a questionnaire, distributed among car drivers living 
outside the city of Nijmegen and working or spending their free time in Nijmegen on a 
regular basis. Nijmegen, a medium-sized city situated in the east of the Netherlands, has been 
chosen because of its accessibility problems, especially from the north side of the ‘River 
Waal’. From that side, the city is only to be reached by the bridge ‘Waalbrug’, which leads to 
a dense stream of traffic.  
The target group was approached in two different ways. Firstly, in the historical centre of 
Nijmegen and in another major, suburban, shopping centre in Nijmegen, car drivers who just 
parked their car were approached by interviewers and asked whether they were willing to fill 
out a questionnaire. If they said they were, interviewers checked whether they belonged to the 
target group, and if so, they were asked to provide their home address. The questionnaire was 
mailed to this address, together with a self-addressed envelope. Secondly, car drivers working 
in Nijmegen and living outside the city were approached through a selected number of big 
companies. These companies could choose between sending an email address with a link to 
an Internet questionnaire or sending a paper version by mail to the home address. The data 
collection took place in the second half of June 2002. 
In total, 805 people filled out the questionnaire; 500 completed the paper version, and 305 
completed the questionnaire on the Internet. The characteristics of the response group are 
listed in table 2, showing that (1) as many men as women filled out the questionnaire; (2) as 
many higher-educated people filled out the questionnaire as middle- or lower-educated 
people; (3) most respondents were between 30 and 50 years old, but the younger and older 
groups were substantially represented as well; (4) most respondents have a (compact) middle 
class car; (5) almost all respondents have owner-occupied cars; (6) most respondents have no 
experience with P&R facilities, and (7) 7 out of 10 respondents have experience with public 
transport in general. From these results, there are no reasons to believe it was an untypical 
group of respondents. 
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Table 2. Response group characteristics 
 
Absolute 
(N=734) 
Relative 
(100%) 
1 Sex 
  
Male  439 54.5 
Female 356 44.2 
Missing values 10 1.2 
2 Education level 
  
Bachelor’s/master’s degree 445 55.3 
Lower or intermediate education 351 43.6 
Missing values 9 1.1 
3 Age 
  
18-30  154 19.1 
31-50  448 55.7 
51+  166 20.6 
Missing values 37 4.6 
4 Category of car  
  
City car / compact class 253 31.4 
Middle class  439 54.5 
Higher middle-class / Top class / Others 101 12.5 
Missing values 12 1.5 
5 Car ownership  
  
Own car 730 90.7 
Leased car 66 8.2 
Missing values 9 1.1 
6 Experience with P&R facilities 
  
Experience 285 35.4 
No experience (rarely or never used) 503 62.5 
Missing values 17 2.1 
7 Experience with PT in general    
Experience 567 70.4 
No experience (rarely or never used) 232 28.8 
Missing values 6 0.7 
4. Analysis and results 
4.1 Model estimation 
To estimate the universal logit model of P&R choice, the choices for each choice set were 
aggregated to arrive at choice frequencies. To determine whether extending the main-effects 
only model with cross-effects improves the model fit, the log-likelihood values of both 
models are compared. The log-likelihood of the main-effects-only model is equal to –9742 
and improves to –9622 after extension with the cross-effects. Hence, the value of the 
Likelihood Ratio Statistic is equal to 120. For a difference of 12 degrees of freedom, the Chi-
square test gives a p-value equal to 0.000, from which can be inferred that extending the 
model with the cross-effects results in a statistically significant improvement of the model fit.  
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4.2 Main-effects  
The estimated main- and cross-effects are presented in table 3. Although the main-effects 
have been presented and discussed in detail in Bos (Bos, 2004; Bos et al., 2004), we provide 
a summary of the results here to form a base reference for understanding the cross-effects. 
Effect coding (-1, 0, 1) was applied to code the attribute-levels, which means that part-worth 
utilities can be derived from the estimated coefficients that denote the contribution of an 
attribute level to the overall utility of an alternative. 
Because the current public transport alternative constituted the base alternative, travellers’ 
utility of public transport is given a utility of zero by definition, which forms a base reference 
for the utilities of the other alternatives. The positive value of the intercepts of both P&R and 
car suggests that, on average, these two alternatives are preferred to the public transport 
alternative. The intercept of the car is higher than the intercept of the P&R alternative, 
indicating that, on average, the car is preferred to the P&R alternative. 
 
Table 3. Estimated main and cross-effects for Nijmegen 
  Main-effects Cross-effects 
Attribute Level Coeff. P[Z>z] Coeff. P[Z>z] 
ASC P&R  0.251 0.00   
Quality P&R 4 -0.651 0.00 0.017 0.67 
  6 0.061 0.18 -0.018 0.65 
  8 0.590  0.001  
Quality PT 4 -0.517 0.00 0.086 0.04 
  6 0.020 0.67 -0.037 0.35 
  8 0.497  -0.049  
Time loss P&R 0 min 0.529 0.00 0.127 0.00 
(compared to free-flow car trip) 10 min 0.239 0.00 0.008 0.84 
  20 min -0.768  -0.135  
Costs of P&R € 0.-- 0.505 0.00 -0.033 0.43 
  € 2.-- 0.032 0.49 0.124 0.00 
  € 4.-- -0.537  -0.091  
ASC car  1.222 0.00   
Delays by car 0 min 0.820 0.00 -0.491 0.00 
(compared to free-flow car trip) 20 min -0.038 0.33 0.110 0.02 
  40 min -0.781  0.381  
Car costs at destination € 0.50 0.415 0.00 -0.053 0.27 
  € 3.50 0.028 0.48 -0.245 0.00 
  € 6.50 -0.443  0.298  
 
All main-effects are in expected directions. Improving the quality of the P&R facilities and 
the connecting public transport, decreasing time loss due to P&R use and lowering P&R 
costs, all increase the P&R utility. Likewise, decreasing car costs and limiting the delays by 
car increases the utility of the car. The utilities are related in a linear way with all the 
attributes, except for time loss when using the P&R alternative. This can be concluded from 
examining the significance of the second level of each attribute. If this attribute level is not 
statistically significant, this means that it is actually equal to zero, implying that changing the 
attribute level from the lowest level to the middle level leads to an equal change in utility as a 
further change from the middle level to the highest level. This does not apply for time loss 
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due to the use of the P&R alternative. An increase of no time loss to 10 minutes time loss 
decreases the utility with 0.290 (= 0.239 - 0.529) utility points, while a further increase from 
10 to 20 minutes results in a utility decrease of 1.058 (= -0.768 - 0.239) utility points. Hence, 
time loss up to 10 minutes results in limited utility decrease, while P&R utility decreases 
more than 3 times as much if time loss becomes greater than 10 minutes.  
Comparing the utility ranges of the attributes gives an indication of the total influence each 
attribute has on the choice of the alternatives. The two time-related attributes seem to have 
the highest impact on utility. However, it has to be taken into account that the ranges in the 
levels of the time attributes differ between the P&R and car alternative. On average, each 
minute extra travel time due to P&R use decreases the utility with 0.065 (=1.296/20) points, 
while each minute extra travel time per car decreases the utility with 0.040 point (=1.601/40). 
Additional analyses indicated that this difference is statistically significant. Likewise, it can 
be calculated that each extra euro travel costs related to P&R decreases the utility with 0.261 
points, while each extra euro related to car only decreases the utility with 0.143 points. Thus, 
comparing the time- and cost-related attributes between P&R and cars indicates that travellers 
are more sensitive to changes in the P&R alternative than to changes in the car alternative. 
This suggests that implementing ‘carrot’ policy measures aiming at improving the P&R 
alternative would have a greater effect on the P&R choice than implementing ‘stick’ policy 
measures aiming at making the car alternative less attractive. Whether this is true indeed will 
be investigated next by examining the cross-effects and predicting the choice behaviour for 
different ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’ policy packages.  
4.3 Cross-effects 
The cross-effects are also presented in table 3. The greatest cross-effects are observed for the 
attribute travel time delays by car. The cross-effect for the attribute level no delays by car is 
equal to –0.491. This means that when travel time of the car alternative takes this value, the 
utility in P&R drops by 0.491. If, on the other hand, the attribute level 40 minutes delay is 
present in the car alternative, the utility of the P&R alternative increases by 0.381 utility 
points. Hence, due to 40 minutes delay, the utility of P&R increases, whereas the utility of the 
public transport alternative does not. The result is that proportionally more travellers than 
predicted under the IIA-assumption will switch from car to P&R and a less than a 
proportional amount will switch from car to public transport. Likewise, if the car costs are 
increased with 6.5 euros, the attractiveness of P&R will also increase more than 
proportionally. These results suggest that if ‘stick’ policy measures are applied, and thus the 
car alternative is made less attractive, P&R profits more than proportionally. Apparently, car 
drivers prefer to use the car for the longer part of the trip, and are thus more likely to switch 
at the P&R facility than choosing the door-to-door public transport alternative when the car 
alternative becomes less attractive. As the cross-effects come on top of utility difference 
caused by the main-effects, this can be considered to be a ‘stick’ bonus. 
While the greatest cross-effect is plausible, the negative cross-effect for 3.5 euros increase in 
car costs is less easy to understand. This effect implies that the P&R alternative profits less 
than proportionally if car costs are increased with a moderate amount of money.  
Compared to the cross-effect estimated for the car-related attributes, the cross-effects 
estimated for the P&R related attributes are much smaller. The greatest effect is observed for 
the attribute time loss due to use P&R. If there is a loss of 20 minutes, public transport seems 
to profit more than proportionally while, if there is no time loss, the car seems to profit more 
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than proportionally. The latter result suggests that improving the P&R alternative in the sense 
of severely limiting the time loss due to using P&R results in a car bonus, which is 
considered to be an undesired effect.  
Improving the quality of the connecting public transport leads to a more than proportional 
decrease in the car alternative, which can be considered to be a ‘carrot’ bonus; however, the 
effect is rather small. Finally, the cross-effects for costs or P&R reveal a mixed result: the car 
alternative seems to profit more from a modest increase from 0 to 2 euros, while public 
transport seems to profit more from a further increase to 4 euros. In sum, the cross-effects 
estimated for the P&R alternatives show mixed results. This raises the question whether these 
effects are consistent or whether these are just random effects. A replication of this study 
sheds some light on this question.  
4.4 A replication of cross-effects 
In order to tackle concerns about the generalizability of the model, an additional data 
collection has been conducted. In this replication the same methodology was applied as in the 
first study, but instead of selecting only respondents in the Nijmegen region, they are selected 
all over the country. In total 364 respondents completely filled out the questionnaire via the 
Internet. From the response characteristics of this sample, there are no reasons to believe it 
was an untypical group of respondents. In a comparison of both studies, we concluded that 
the attribute-main-effects are largely comparable, except for the fact that they are consistently 
smaller in the second study. We refer to Bos (2004) for a more detailed description of the 
second study and the comparison of the main-effects between both studies.  
The universal logit model estimated for the second study is presented in table 4. Considering 
the cross-effects for the attributes describing the P&R alternative, differences are observed 
compared with the first study. The cross-effects for the quality of P&R are now significant, 
while these effects were not significant in the first model. On the other hand, the cross-effects 
for the remaining P&R related attributes are not significant in the second study, while these 
effects were significant in the first study. Moreover, some effects change signs. Hence, this 
comparison shows that the cross-effects for the P&R related attributes are not very consistent 
and therefore not very trustworthy. It is therefore probably better not to base any substantial 
conclusions on these results.  
On the other hand, the cross-effects for the car-related attributes reveal the same tendency as 
in the first model. Also in this model these cross-effects have the greatest influence. The 
similarity in these results enhances our trust in the cross-effects of the first model. Overall, it 
may be concluded that there are significant cross-effects for the car-related alternatives. P&R 
profits more than proportionally in case the car alternative becomes less attractive due to 
higher costs and time loss. Hence, as these attributes are related to ‘stick’ policy measures, it 
can be concluded that there is a ‘stick’ policy bonus.  
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Table 4. Estimated main and cross-effects for the Netherlands as a whole 
  Main-effects Cross-effects 
Attribute Level Coeff. P[Z>z] Coeff. P[Z>z] 
ASC P&R  -0.132 0.02   
Quality P&R 4 -0.398 0.00 -0.135 0.01 
  6 0.015 0.84 0.083 0.12 
  8 0.383  0.053  
Quality PT 4 -0.179 0.02 -0.039 0.47 
  6 -0.137 0.06 0.020 0.70 
  8 0.316  0.018  
Time loss P&R 0 min 0.368 0.00 0.078 0.15 
(compared to free-flow car trip) 10 min -0.012 0.87 -0.018 0.74 
  20 min -0.356  -0.060  
Costs of P&R € 0.-- 0.453 0.00 0.034 0.52 
  € 2.-- -0.027 0.70 -0.006 0.91 
  € 4.-- -0.426  -0.029  
ASC car  1.718 0.00   
Delays by car 0 min 0.489 0.00 -0.295 0.00 
(compared to free-flow car trip) 20 min -0.091 0.08 0.014 0.84 
  40 min -0.397  0.281  
Car costs at destination € 0.50 0.201 0.00 -0.059 0.42 
  € 3.50 -0.058 0.27 -0.160 0.03 
  € 6.50 -0.144  0.219  
 
4.5 Predictive ability  
In addition to the discussion of the face validity and generalizability of the results, we 
examine whether the extension of the MNL model with cross-effects improves the prediction 
for new observations. To that effect, two holdout choice sets were included in the 
questionnaire. These holdout choice sets are additional choice sets with the same lay-out as 
the other choice sets which are not used to estimate the model. The choice probabilities 
predicted by the MNL model and by the universal choice model are compared with the 
choice probabilities for the holdout sets being based on observations. 
Table 5 presents the results for these comparisons. Comparing the predictive success of both 
models, it can be observed that the extension of the MNL model with cross-effects results in 
lower absolute deviations than when the MNL model is used. Thus, it can be concluded that 
the extension of the MNL model with cross-effects not only leads to a better model fit, as 
discussed before, but also improves the predictive ability of the model to predict the market 
share for new observations. 
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Table 5. Predictions of modal splits for the holdouts choice sets by both the model 
without cross-effects and the model including cross-effects for the Nijmegen case  
    
  
MNL 
(without cross-effects) 
extended MNL 
(with cross-effects) 
   
Hold-out (HO) 
profile Reported Predicted Deviation Prediction Deviation 
HO1 P&R Quality P&R is 6 40.9 32.3 -8.6 36.7 -4.2 
  Quality PT is 6      
  Extra time 0 min      
  Extra costs € 4      
  Car Extra time 40 min 38.6 46.1 7.5 44.2 5.6 
  Extra costs € 0.50      
  PT Base alternative 20.5 21.6 1.1 19.1 -1.4 
Mean absolute difference   5.7  3.7 
HO2 P&R Quality P&R is 6 21.2 17.4 -3.8 15.1 -6.1 
  Quality PT is 6      
  Extra time 20 min      
  Extra costs € 0      
  Car Extra time 0 min 59.4 70.2 10.8 67.8 8.4 
  Extra costs € 6.50      
  PT Base alternative 19.4 12.4 -7.0 17.1 -2.3 
Mean absolute difference   7.2  5.6 
4.6 An illustration  
The impact of the cross-effects is illustrated by comparing the modal splits predicted by the 
MNL model and by the universal logit model for two rather extreme ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’ 
policy measure packages, all based on the Nijmegen case. To enable comparison, a base-
scenario is introduced in which the quality of the P&R facility and the quality of connecting 
public transport are of medium quality (evaluated with a 6 on a ten-point scale), the P&R fee 
is € 4 and the extra time loss due to using the P&R facility is 20 minutes. No time delays 
occur when using the car and no car fees are charged when entering the urban area, hence 
only additional fuel costs are included.  
In this illustration it is assumed that the package of ‘carrot’ measures results in decreasing 
time loss when using the P&R facility from 20 to 0 minutes (for example by realizing a free 
(bus) lane for the connecting public transport) and decreasing the P&R fee from € 4 to € 0. It 
is further assumed that the package of ‘stick’ measures results in increasing car delays from 0 
to 40 minutes (for example by reducing the number of parking lots, resulting in longer 
walking distances or longer times required to find a parking lot indeed) and increasing the car 
costs at destination side from € 0.50 to € 6.50.  
Both the MNL model and the universal logit model are applied to predict the ‘carrots’ and 
‘sticks’ package effects on the modal split between P&R, car and current public transport. 
Because we do not trust the cross-effects estimated for the attributes describing the P&R 
alternative as discussed before, these cross-effects are excluded when applying the universal 
logit model.  
The impact of including cross-effects in the prediction is presented in table 6. The model 
without cross-effects, the estimated MNL model, predicts that the ‘carrot’ package results in 
a higher P&R patronage than the ‘stick’ measure package. However, if the model with cross-
Bos and Molin 
European Journal of Transport and Infrastructure Research 
287
effects is applied, i.e. the estimated universal logit model, the order is reversed due to the 
‘stick’ measure bonus. This illustrates that incorrect conclusions concerning the impact of 
possible policy measures may be drawn when predictions are based on the conventional 
MNL model. Thus, this illustration shows the potential of estimating cross-effects in order to 
take the competition between choice alternatives into account.  
Furthermore, the cross-effect model predictions also indicate that implementing exclusively 
‘carrot’ measures partly goes at the expense of PT. On the other hand, implementing 
exclusively ‘stick’ measures hugely increases public transport patronage. It is obvious that 
P&R patronage will benefit most from a combination of ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’ policy packages, 
which is in agreement with the findings by Papoulias and Heggie (1975), the UK 
government’s travel plan guide (1999), Rye (2002) and Hole (2004). Hence, the ‘combined 
carrot and stick’ measure package reduces car usage most. If this package is implemented, 
most car drivers will switch to P&R, whereas only a relatively small will switch to public 
transport for the complete trip. Although the gain in public transport patronage is small, these 
results suggest that combining ‘stick and carrot’ policy measures will not be at the expense of 
public transport patronage but rather improves it, which is a very relevant finding for 
policymaking. 
 
Table 6. Illustration of impact of cross-effects on modal split  
 
Without cross-effects 
(MNL model) 
With cross-effects 
(universal logit model) 
 P&R Car PT P&R Car PT 
Base-scenario 2.9 89.4 7.7 1.7 90.5 7.8 
‘Carrot’ measure package 23.6 70.3 6.0 15.2 78.1 6.7 
‘Stick’ measure package 15.9 42.0 42.1 27.2 36.4 36.5 
‘Combined’ measure package 66.2 16.9 16.9 79.1 10.6 10.2 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper a universal logit model was estimated for P&R patronage. This model was based 
on the choices observed for 805 car drivers in a stated choice experiment among P&R, car, 
and current public transport alternatives. The attribute-main-effects suggest that car drivers 
are more sensitive to changes in the travel time and costs of the P&R facilities than to 
changes in the same attributes related to the car alternative. This suggests that ‘carrot’ policy 
measures aiming at improving the P&R alternative would be more effective than ‘stick’ 
policy measures aiming at making the car less attractive. However, the estimated attribute-
cross-effects suggest that changing the levels of car-related attributes, i.e. increasing travel 
time and car costs, results in increased utility of P&R. Considering both main- and cross-
effects, it becomes clear that ‘stick’ policy measures outweigh the effects of ‘carrot’ policy 
measures on P&R patronage. The results of this study therefore suggest that applying ‘stick’ 
policy measures to discourage car use in congested urban areas may be more effective to 
increase P&R patronage than applying ‘carrot’ policy measures by making the P&R 
alternatives as attractive as possible.  
It goes without saying that combining both types of measures will be most effective. This is 
also the most elegant policy to apply: making the car alternative less attractive in problem 
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areas, as for example inner cities, while at the same time offering high-quality alternatives. 
This is illustrated by applying the model to predict market shares for car, P&R and public 
transport use after introducing several policy measure packages. The illustration also suggests 
that increased P&R patronage due to implementing combined ‘carrot and stick’ policy 
measures will not be at the expense of public transport patronage choice for the complete trip, 
but rather improves it, which is a very relevant finding for policymaking.  
Although the universal logit model has not often been applied in transportation studies to 
estimate cross-effects and sometimes found to produce counterintuitive results, in this study 
the estimated cross-effects could be interpreted very well and were plausible. The substantial 
cross-effects could also be replicated in a second data set. Furthermore, adding cross-effects 
to the main-effects estimated from a conventional MNL model significantly improved the 
model fit and the extended model was found to predict the choices for new observations 
better than the conventional MNL model. This rather successful application of the universal 
model may add to the reconsideration of the application of the universal logit model in stated 
choice transportation studies to relax the IIA-assumption. The more so as it requires a simple, 
straightforward estimation procedure and imposes only limited additional requirements to the 
experimental design.   
The model estimated in this paper also has some limitations. Because respondents were 
presented choice sets always including a car, a P&R and a PT alternative, cross-effects could 
only be estimated at the attribute level and not at the alternative level. Hence, from these 
observed choices cannot be tested whether adding or deleting an alternative from the choice 
set has a more or less proportional effect on the choice of the available alternatives. This 
model therefore cannot shed any light on a finding presented in the literature (Parkhurst, 
1995) that introducing P&R in a given situation abstracts more users from public transport 
than from cars. The model presented in this paper could be extended to predict such effects; 
however, this requires an extension of the experimental design and thus additional 
observations. In addition to choice sets that include all three alternatives (car, P&R and PT), 
choice sets should then be designed that include only two alternatives: only a car and a PT 
alternative and only a P&R and a PT alternative. The alternative availability effects that can 
then be estimated indicate possible deviations from the IIA-assumption at the alternative 
level. This extension would also require that current public transport users would be recruited 
as respondents, whereas the focus of this paper was on the switching behaviour of car drivers. 
The model estimated from these extensions could answer the policy-relevant question 
whether or not the introduction of a P&R alternative draws proportionally more users from 
PT than from cars.  
Another limitation of the model in fact applies to all stated choice models and refers to the 
stated nature of the observed choices: one is never entirely sure to what extent stated choices 
reflect choices in the real world. Therefore, one should be careful to interpret predicted 
market shares in absolute terms, although interpretations in qualitative terms to compare 
effects of several policy packages, as is done in this paper, are reasonable. In order to 
improve the validity of the market shares, one could additionally observe revealed choices in 
areas where P&R facilities are already implemented. These revealed choices could be used to 
validate the stated choices. In specific circumstances, both types of observations could be 
pooled to arrive at combined stated and revealed choice models that potentially produce more 
valid modal split predictions.  
Bos and Molin 
European Journal of Transport and Infrastructure Research 
289
References 
Ben-Akiva, M. (1974). Note on the specification of a Logit Model with Utility Functions that 
Include Attributes of Competing Alternatives. Working Paper, Department of Civil 
Engineering, MIT, Cambridge, Mass. 
Ben-Akiva, M. and Lerman, S.R. (1985). Discrete Choice Analysis: Theory and Application 
to Travel Demand. Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press. 
Bos, I. (2004). Changing Seats: A Behavioural Analysis of P&R Use. T 2004/8, TRAIL 
Thesis Series, The Netherlands. 
Bos, I.D.M., Molin, E.J.E., Timmermans, H. and Heijden, van der, R.E.C.M. (2003). 
Cognitions and Relative Importances Underlying Consumer Valuation of Park and Ride 
Facilities. Transportation Research Record, vol. 1835, pp. 121-127. 
Bos, I.D.M., Heijden, van der, R.E.C.M., Molin, E.J.E. and Timmermans, H.J.P. (2004). The 
Choice of Park & Ride Facilities: An Analysis Using a Context-Dependent Hierarchical 
Choice Experiment. Environment and Planning A, nol. 36, no. 9, pp. 1673-1686 
Ghali, M.O., Pursula, M., Milne, D., Keranen, M.,  Daleno M. and Vougiokas, M. (1997). 
Assessing the impact of integrated trans modal urban transport pricing on modal split. 
Proceedings of Seminar E held at PTRC European Transport Forum, vol. P414, pp. 341-352. 
Hole, A.R. (2004). Forecasting the demand for an employee Park and Ride service using 
commuters’ stated choices. Transport Policy, vol. 11, pp. 355-362. 
Louviere, J.J., Hensher, D.A. and Swait, J.D. (2000). Stated Choice Methods: Analysis and 
Application. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
McFadden, D. (1975). On Independence, Structure and Simultaneity in Transportation 
Demand Analysis. Working Paper 7511, Urban Travel Demand Forecasting Project, Institute 
of Transportation Studies, University of California, Berkely. 
McFadden, D., Train, K. and Tye, W.B. (1978). An Application of Diagnostic Tests for the 
Independence From Irrelevance Alternatives Property of the Multinomial Logit Model. 
Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board, vol. 637, 
pp. 39-46. 
O’Fallon, C., Sullivan, C. and Hensher, D.A. (2004). Constraints Affecting Mode Choices by 
Morning Car Commuters. Transport Policy, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 17-29 
Papoulias, D.B. and Heggie, I.G. (1975). Forecasting the number and characteristics of 
potential users of park-and-ride in Oxford. Traffic Engineering and Control, pp. 549-556. 
Parkhurst, G.P. (1995). Park and Ride: Could It Lead to an Increase in Car Traffic? Transport 
Policy, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 15-23. 
Rye, T. (2002). Travel Plans: do they work. Transport Policy, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 287-298. 
The UK Government’s Travel Plan Guide (1999). A travel Plan Resource Pack for 
Employers. DETR, London. 
 
Is there a ‘Stick’ Bonus?  
A Stated Choice Model for P&R Patronage incorporating Cross-Effects 
European Journal of Transport and Infrastructure Research 
290 
 
